MICHAEL SULLIVAN & ASSOCIATES BLOG

Nearly one-quarter century ago, in Tenet/Centinela Hospital Medical Center v. WCAB (Rushing) (2000) 80 Cal. App. 4th 1041, the Court of Appeal held that when a treating physician has declared the employee's injury to be permanent and stationary, has released the employee to return to work and has prescribed no further doctor-involved treatment or visits, the employee did not have a right to change treating doctors just because future medical care was warranted. Instead, the court explained that the employee was required to comply with the provisions of California Code of Regulations, Title 8, § 9785(b), and Labor Code § 4061 and § 4062, to change primary treating doctors (PTPs).

When a party disputes an order, decision, or award issued by a workers' compensation judge (WCJ), there are two options for appeal. Pursuant to Labor Code § 5900, a party may file a petition for reconsideration of a "final order, decision, or award made and filed by the appeals board or a workers' compensation judge." On the other hand, LC 5310 states, "The appeals board may ... remove to itself, or transfer to a workers' compensation administrative law judge the proceedings on any claim." A petition for removal is the appropriate remedy for interim, nonfinal orders.

As discussed in an earlier Special Report,^[1] for more than 30 years, the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) relied on Shipley v. WCAB (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 1104 to decide petitions for reconsideration, even if it did not act timely on a petition pursuant to Labor Code § 5909. That statute states, "A petition for reconsideration is deemed to have been denied by the appeals board unless it is acted upon within 60 days from the date of filing." Based on Shipley, the WCAB generally held that if a petition was not considered within the time limit of LC 5909 due to the WCAB's own inadvertent error, it still may decide the merits of the petition, even if the 60-day time period has elapsed.

In 2020, the California Legislature passed Senate Bill 1159 (SB 1159), which established a rebuttable presumption for specified employees that illness or death resulting from COVID-19 arose out of and in the course of employment. The presumptions were established in Labor Code §§ 3212.86, LC 3212.87 and LC 3212.88.

In the Senate Floor Analysis for SB 1159, the Legislature believed that the burden of fighting COVID-19 had fallen disproportionately on a small group of workers in both the private and public sectors. The presumptions were enacted to reduce the barriers to accessing the workers’ compensation system for essential workers suffering from COVID-19.^[1] So for several years, the COVID-19 presumptions made it easier for many workers to prove entitlement to workers' compensation benefits for illnesses related to COVID-19.

The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) has historically and increasingly faced a struggle to handle the volume of cases that come its way. As a result, too often it has failed to take action on a filed petition for reconsideration within the statutorily required 60 days. To date, parties have been protected from that failure because it was deemed a due process right to have the petition reviewed by the WCAB. Currently, scores and perhaps hundreds of cases are in that situation. In a new appellate court case, Zurich American Insurance Co. v. WCAB, it all seems to have changed, leaving all those parties without a remedy, and changing the reconsideration demands on practitioners.

An employer must conduct utilization review (UR) to determine whether to approve, modify or deny a request for treatment. If the medical services have not been provided, Labor Code 4610(i)(1) normally requires the UR determination to be made within "five normal business days from the receipt of a request for authorization for medical treatment and supporting information reasonably necessary to make the determination, but in no event more than 14 days from the date of the medical treatment recommendation by the physician." California Code of Regulations § 9792.9.1(c)(3) generally requires prospective or concurrent UR decisions to be made within five business days from the date of receipt of the completed DWC form RFA (request for authorization).

Labor Code § 4062.2 establishes the procedure to be followed "[w]henever a comprehensive medical evaluation is required to resolve any dispute arising out of an injury or a claimed injury occurring on or after January 1, 2005, and the employee is represented by an attorney." A party may request a panel of qualified medical evaluators (QME panel) the first working day that's at least 10 days after the date of mailing a request for a medical evaluation pursuant to LC 4060, or the first working day that's at least 10 days after the date of mailing an objection pursuant to LC 4061 or LC 4062.

On June 22, 2023, in Nunes v. State of California, Dept. of Motor Vehicles,^[1] the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) issued an en banc holding that:

1. Labor Code § 4663 "requires a reporting physician to make an apportionment determination and prescribes the standard for apportionment. The Labor Code makes no statutory provision for 'vocational apportionment.'"
2. "Vocational evidence may be used to address issues relevant to the determination of permanent disability."
3. "Vocational evidence must address apportionment, and may not substitute impermissible 'vocational apportionment' in place of otherwise valid medical apportionment."